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Abstract: This article investigates the function and reality of language in Niklas Luhmann‘s 
systems theory. How can one interpret the systems-theoretical assumption that language is 
based  on  communication?  Luhmann  describes  language  as  a  dynamic  media/form 
relationship, which is able to couple the social and psychological system. This structural 
coupling, which constructs consciousness and language as two autonomous systems, raises 
problems if one defines language from a cognitive point of view. This article discusses these 
problems  and  aims  to  develop  assumptions  and  questions  within  the  systems-theoretical 
approach.  
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Resumo:  O  presente  artigo  investiga  a  função  e  realidade  da  linguagem  na  teoria  dos 
sistemas de Niklas Luhmann. Como se pode interpretar a suposição sistêmico-teórica de que 
a linguagem é baseada na comunicação? Luhmann descreve a linguagem como uma relação 
dinâmica entre meio e forma, a qual é capaz de ligar o sistema social e psicológico. Essa 
conexão estrutural, que constroi a consciência e a linguagem como dois sistemas autônomos, 
gera problemas quando se define a linguagem do ponto de vista cognitivo. Este artigo discute 
tais problemas e pretende desenvolver suposições e questões a partir da própria abordagem 
sistêmico-teórica. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Although well known for his prolific scholarly productivity, Niklas Luhmann granted 
only rhapsodic asides to the topic of language. In quantitative terms alone, language 
would have to pervade at least some of his works (LUHMANN 1987: 209ff.; LUHMANN 
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1994: 47ff.; LUHMANN 1997: 205ff.). But a review of Luhmann‘s comprehensive list 
of  publications  reveals  that  the  topic  of  language  is  insufficiently  explored.
2  This 
finding is also curious in a qualitative sense, given that language plays an important 
role in the constitution of communicative processes in  systems-theory. Luhmann 
claims  that  ―language  must  be  changed  to  the  more  fundamental  concept  of 
communication‖  (LUHMANN  1994:  51).
3  With that, he decisively distinguishes his 
conception of language from traditional philosophical approaches to the same. Fo r 
Luhmann, language is no longer attributed to the subject or consciousness, but rather 
belongs to communication. By no means, however, does this diminish the importance 
of language in systems-theory. On the contrary, language retains critical functions 
with regard to the differentiation of the psychic and communicative systems.   
The goal of this article is to present and problematize the function and reality 
of  language  in  Luhmann‘s  systems-theory.  How  can  one  work  with  the  systems-
theoretical  assumption  that  language  must  be  thought  as  communication?  What 
consequences and problems arise from the methodological separation of language and 
consciousness? To answer these questions, I will first explain Luhmann‘s conception 
of communication (Part 1) and then its relation to consciousness (Part 2). Luhmann 
describes language as a dynamic relation between medium and form, whereby social 
and psychic systems are structurally coupled (Part 3). This structural coupling, which 
speaks  to  the  status  of  consciousness  and  language  as  two  distinctly  emerging 
systems,  challenges  the  assumption  that  language  develops  cognitively.  Part  4 
elucidates these problems not from the perspective of another language-theoretical 
position,  such  as  psychoanalysis,  but  rather  in  terms  of  systems-theory‘s  own 
assumptions and questions. 
 
                                                           
2 Accordingly, there is little scholarship on Luhmann‘s conception of language. The work that addresses 
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example, MÜLLER, FOHRMANN, THEISEN. 
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1.  Communication and Consciousness 
 
The Historische Wörterbuch der Philosophie [Historical Dictionary of Philosophy] 
sketches the history of the impact of the concept ―communication‖ and shows that 
above  all it is  the etymological  meaning of communication that is  crucial for the 
traditional  understanding  of  this  category:  ―Since  antiquity,  the  Latin  word 
‗communicatio‘ has had a broad range of meanings within the radius of utterance, 
permission-granting, connection, exchange, circulation, association, and community‖ 
(STERNSCHULTE  1976:  893).
4  This  conception  points  to  an  intersubject ive 
transmission of messages within a community in which subjects interact with one 
another by communicating. But this is exactly the conception criticized by systems -
theory:  ―The  metaphor  of  transmission  is  unusable  because  it  implies  too  much 
ontology‖  (LUHMANN  1995,  139).
5  For Luhmann, communication in the sense of 
transmission  is  a  product  of  the  ―old  European‖  philosophy  of  consciousness  or 
subjectivity. This approach presents consciousness as something accessible to other 
subjects  and  the  concept  of  communicative  transmission  suggests  an  open 
consciousness that is capable of making epistemological gains. But this is precisely 
the  model  of  consciousness  criticized  by  systems-theory  (LUHMANN  1985;  1995; 
POTHAST 1987). Communication is no longer to be understood as a bridge between 
subjects.  Rather,  it  is  only  structurally  coupled  with  consciousness  and  is  thereby 
bound  to  its  own  autopoietic  processes.  In  this  way,  one  can  conceive  of 
communication as an emergent reality, which is ―desensualized‖ from subjects. While 
communication indeed depends on consciousness, it is not reducible to it.  
The  actual  components  of  communication  are  selections.  This  means  that 
communication always entails a momentary choice of observations: ―Communication 
                                                           
4 ―Das lateinische Wort ‗communicatio‘ hat seit der Antike ein weites Bedeutungsfeld im Umkreis von 
Mitteilung,  Gewährung,  Verbindung,  Austausch,  Verkehr,  Umgang,  Gemeinschaft‖  (STERNSCHULTE 
1976: 893). 
5 ―Die Übertragungsmetapher ist unbrauchbar, weil zu viel Ontologie impliziert‖ (LUHMANN 1987: 
193). 4 
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is the processing of selection‖ (LUHMANN 1995: 140).
6 By linking communication 
with observation, the former comes to be regarded as a complex undertaking insofar 
as social systems, or rather the communications thereof, can mutually observe one 
another. Observing is no longer the exclusive performance of a psychic system, but an 
abstract procedure. By means of its capacity for observation, communication can be 
considered as a process full of events, in which momentary decisions are made about 
what is being communicated. The unmarked communications are always a lready 
inherent within this process. In this way, one can always understand communication 
as a unity of difference.  
It is not without reason that Luhmann makes an ironic allusion to the original 
fall  of  man  in  the  following  passage  about  communication:  ―Once  embroiled  in 
communication, one can never return to the paradise of innocent souls‖ (LUHMANN 
1995: 150).
7 Communication does indeed appear to possess diabolical characteristics. 
Imagine the following situation: the devil observes God. In so doing, he i s observing 
something that does not allow itself to be observed, because God constitutes the 
presupposition of the distinguishableness of the devil himself, and to that extent is 
unobservable. If, in spite of this, the devil observes God, he generates a difference and 
comes  to  observe  the  unity  of  a  difference  in  place  of  an  unmarked  unity. 
Communication can also, like the devil, mark the unity of a difference. The decision 
as  to  which  side  of  an  observation  should  be  marked  is  left  to  the  ―laws‖  of 
contingency,  which  does  not  mean  that  communication  takes  place  in  a  purely 
arbitrary or chaotic manner. Contingency rather implies that the possible and the real 
are respectively thematized in the drawing of a distinction: ―Something is contingent 
insofar as it is neither necessary nor impossible; it is just what it is (or was or will be), 
though it could also be otherwise‖ (LUHMANN 1995: 106).
8 
                                                           
6 ―Kommunikation ist Prozessieren von Selektion‖ (LUHMANN 1987: 194). 
7 ―Einmal in Kommunikation verstrickt, kommt man nie wieder in das Paradies der einfachen Seelen 
zurück‖ (LUHMANN 1987: 207). 
8 ―Kontingent ist etwas, was weder notwendig noch unmöglich ist; was also so wie es ist (war, sein 
wird), sein kann, aber auch anders möglich ist‖ (LUHMANN 1987: 152). 5 
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What  does  communication  cull  from  this  contingent-selective  process? 
Luhmann mentions three elements that can both be selected and select at the same 
time:  ―Every  communication  differentiates  and  synthesizes  its  own  components, 
namely  information,  utterance,  and  understanding‖  (LUHMANN  1994:  24).
9 
Information, utterance, and understanding are the components of communication and, 
according  to  Luhmann,  these  elements  must  simultaneously  differentiate  and 
synthesize themselves. One can only speak of communication when all three of these 
elements interact at the same time. The kind of interaction in question here must be 
thought of in terms of the theory of observation, in which information, utterance, and 
understanding are themselves able to make distinctions. Information is thus not a 
function of consciousness, by which it is generated through psychic or cognitive 
processes. Rather, information is always the product of an observing system‘s own 
operations. It is created through communication itself and is never simply given as 
part of the system‘s environment: ―By information we mean an  event that selects 
system states‖ (LUHMANN 1995: 67, emphasis there).
10 Information must therefore be 
designated as a distinction, which informs about a difference. But of what does 
information consist then? It is neither a component of a signifying system (as in 
semiotics), nor is it a psychic im pulse of consciousness. Luhmann does not further 
explain the exact characteristics or ―substance‖ of information, because he is more 
interested in how things function as opposed to what they are. The point here is thus 
to  clarify  how  information  functions  and,  according  to  Luhmann,  information 
functions as a difference that generates a difference. It is an observation, which marks 
a distinction, whereby the unmarked side of the distinction is likewise given.  
Utterance constitutes the second element of communication and it is the way in 
which information is ―conveyed.‖ Utterance is also a selection that can proceed one 
way  or  the  other.  The  third  component  of  communication,  understanding,  must 
likewise be regarded as a difference and one can only speak of a communication when 
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Mitteilung und Verstehen‖ (LUHMANN 1994: 24). 
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the utterance‘s information  is understood selectively. According to Luhmann, it is 
improbable that one understands the other at all, for ―understanding always includes 
misunderstanding‖ (LUHMANN 1995:158).
11 This description of communication as a 
process of selection consisting in information, utterance, and understanding, a process 
that can generate itself, has decisive theoretical consequences. Communication is no 
longer conceived as an event of consciousness. Accordingly, people participating in a 
communicative process are black -boxed, or rendered opaque, with regard to one 
another. There is no longer any model of intersubjectivity —on the basis of which 
individual  consciousnesses  could  be understood to  become mutually transparent—
operative within the process of communication. Psychic systems and communicative 
systems remain external to one another, but they nonetheless can, or rather, due to the 
relationship  of  mutual  dependency  between  them,  they  must  participate  in 
communication.  Yet  the  dependence  in  question  here  does  not  rest  on  a  mutual 
openness. As an autopoietic system, the psychic system can only connect to its own 
operations. The elements thereof, its thoughts and ideas, can only refer to themselves. 
Thus one thought within the system can only connect to another thought within that 
same system and not immediately to the thought of another psychic system. In order to 
transport thoughts from one psychic system to another, one needs communication to 
occur between at least two psychic systems present to each other. The psychic systems 
constitute  a  kind  of  ―fuel‖,  in  that  they  supply  the  communicative  process  with 
thought material that must be ―transcribed‖ by communication.  
 
2.  Language and Structural Coupling 
 
How is it that thoughts and ideas can be ―transcribed‖ for the communicative process? 
It is here that language plays a decisive role due to its capacity for coupling the social 
and  psychic  systems.  Again,  the  notion  that  language  presents  an  element  of 
consciousness or that it emerges from elements of the psychic system such as thoughts 
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is rejected by systems-theory. Language is no longer located within the domain of the 
psychic system, as a reality that can represent relations external to language. Rather, 
language fosters communication and is brought forth by communication itself. While 
the psychic systems participate in language, they no longer constitute its foundation. 
Language is thus no longer conceived here as a functional unity that makes possible 
and governs social life, thereby constituting a transcendental basis for knowledge. By 
defining language as communication, the former is ―de-ontologized,‖ which is to say 
that it no longer functions as a space in which truth comes to be articulated, but is 
rather a construct that optimizes communication. From this perspective, theoretical 
models of language that are hermeneutic, for example, and treat language as a means 
through which being and truth can be revealed, belong to ―old European‖ thought. But 
systems-theory also regards the conceptions of language put forth by critical theory as 
outdated. In his Ästhetische Theorie (1993: 274 ff.) Theodor W. ADORNO develops a 
notion of a non-conceptual language that can free itself of domination is likewise a 
case  in  which  language  is  not  sufficiently  de-ontologized:  one  can  note  that  for 
Adorno, truth-claims are inherent to the non-communicative conception of language.
12 
There is no room in systems-theory for ontology. Language simply serves to 
improve  the  possibilities  of  communication.  La nguage  presents  a  medium  that 
supports the interpenetration of social and psychic systems. The function of language 
consists  primarily  in  expanding  communicative  possibilities:  ―The  communicative 
system  owes  an  extensive  capacity  for  distinction  along  with  a  well-targeted 
connectivity to language. This is what makes the constitution of complexity possible 
in the communicative system‖ (LUHMANN 1993: 47).
13 Language can optimize the 
synthesis of information, utterance, and understanding in such a way as to ena ble 
communication  to  operate  autopoietically.  It  can  allow  consciousness  and  the 
communicative system to interpenetrate one another, which means that language 
                                                           
12 This is discussed in PLUMPE‘s notes about Adorno‘s art and language conception (1993: 203-247, 
Bd. 2.) 
13  ―Das  Kommunikationssystem  verdankt  der  Sprache  hohe  Unterscheidungsfähigkeit  bei  gezielter 
Anschlussfähigkeit,  und  das  ermöglicht  den  Komplexitätsaufbau  im  Kommunikationssystem‖ 
(LUHMANN 1993: 47). 8 
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makes it possible for systems to draw selectively on the units of other systems in order 
to develop themselves. In this way, consciousness and communication relate to one 
another in open and closed ways at the same time. The mutual externality of one 
system  to  the  other  is  the  necessary  and  constitutive  conditionality  of  each.  The 
communicative system is based on a chain of communicative events, which must be 
continuously supplied with new elements. The innovative elements stemming from 
outside the system that are necessary for the self-preservation of the system cannot 
take shape without the system‘s referring to externals.  
In this relationship of dependence, language plays an important role due to its 
ability to present units of both consciousness and communication in such a way that 
both systems can refer to these in their own ways. But this is not an exchange that 
takes place between the two systems. They remain respectively unchanged. A key 
term for understanding this relationship is the word ―captivate.‖ Language has the 
capacity  to  captivate  consciousness  and  communication.  It  is  not  that  language  is 
thereby considered an internal element of the system, but rather a medium through 
which these systems can be connected. Language constitutes a ―juncture‖ (LUHMANN 
1994: 47)
14 between consciousness and communication that serves as a catalyst for 
each system to use the operations of the other for its own development. Language can 
captivate consciousness in such a way as to totally absorb the latter: ―And in the same 
way, linguistic communication can captivate the consciousness participating in it in 
such a way as to allow communication to move freely without having to repeatedly 
reassure itself of whether people are paying attention and taking note of what is being 
said‖  (LUHMANN  1994:  47).
15  Luhmann refers to reading as an example of this: 
―Whoever  reads  is  practically  inhibited  thereby  and  simply  has  to  stop  reading 
whenever he becomes tired. While speaking or listening, writing or reading, one‘s 
                                                           
14 ―Nahtstelle‖ (LUHMANN 1994: 47) 
15 ―Und ebenso kann die sprachliche Kommunikation das teilnehmende Bewusstsein derart fesseln, dass 
die Kommunikation sich frei bewegen kann, ohne sich ständig thematisch zu vergewissern, ob die Leute 
noch aufpassen und sich merken, was gesagt wird‖ (LUHMANN 1994: 47). 9 
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own thought is to a large extent disengaged, otherwise one loses track‖ (LUHMANN 
1994: 49).
16 
In reading a book, one is (ideally) so absorbed therein that he/she blocks out 
his/her own thoughts, which would otherwise interfere with the participation in the 
communicative  process  of  reading.   Consciousness  is  then  so  preoccupied  with 
language that one‘s thoughts and ideas are fixated only on the communicative event. 
The elements of communication – information, utterance, and understanding – must 
be  synthesized  to  facilitate  further  connecting  communications.  The  thoughts  of 
readers play no determining role here, because consciousness, which selects one way 
or the other, is not deciding about communication. Communication itself is deciding. 
Nonetheless,  consciousness  plays  a  necessary  role  in  the  communicative  process, 
which would not be possible at all without it.  
Consciousness‘s constitutive share in communication arises from perception. 
Perception is a ―special competency of consciousness‖ (LUHMANN 2000: 17)
17 and is a 
non-communicative  event  of  consciousness.  Without  perception,  nothing  can  be 
conveyed as having been perceived, which implies that communication depends on 
perception.  Language  can  stimulate  and  irritate  consciousness,  by  making 
―conspicuous objects of perception‖ (LUHMANN 1993: 48)
18 available. The objects of 
perception that can irritate consciousness are words that meet special criteria: ―They 
may not present any similarity to other perceivable objects (sounds, images, etc.); for 
that  would  cause  them  to  continually  seep back into the world  of perception and 
disappear therein‖ (LUHMANN 1994: 48).
19 Words must be specifically constituted so 
as to not be reduced back into the world of perception. This also means that their 
characteristics must be constantly preserved so that they are  always utilizable. Only 
                                                           
16 ―Wer überhaupt liest, ist dadurch praktisch blockiert und muss, wenn er müde wird, eben aufhören zu 
lesen.  Beim  Reden  wie  beim  Zuhören,  beim  Schreiben  wie  beim  Lesen  ist  das  eigene  Denken 
weitgehend ausgeschaltet, sonst verliert man den Faden‖ (LUHMANN 1994: 49). 
17 ―Spezialkompetenz des Bewusstseins‖ (LUHMANN 1997: 17) 
18 ―auffällige Wahrnehmungsgegenstände‖ (LUHMANN 1993: 48) 
19 ―Sie dürfen keinerlei Ähnlichkeit mit sonst wahrnehmbaren Gegenständen (Geräuschen, Bildern etc.) 
aufweisen; denn das würde bewirken, dass sie ständig in die Wahrnehmungswelt wieder einsickern und 
verloren gehen‖ (LUHMANN 1994: 48). 10 
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through the regularities implied by words is it possible for consciousness to irritate 
communication in such a way that generates communication that is more complex and 
more differentiated than is possible through gestures, for example. Only once these 
preconditions are met can one understand how linguistic communication can attract 
the attention of consciousness: ―Consciousness can therefore hardly withdraw itself 
from  a  communication  in  progress.  At  most,  it  can,  while  listening,  entertain 
extravagances  or  attempt  to  irritate  [communication]  with  its  own  contributions‖ 
(LUHMANN 1994: 48).
20 
Words must meet further criteria: ―The perceivable artefacts of language must 
not  only  captivate,  they  must  also  trigger  imagination  in  controllable  ways‖ 
(LUHMANN  1994:  49).
21  Here, Luhmann is developing suggestions from psycho -
linguistics  to  substantiate  his  thesis  about  language‘s  forms:  words  are  based  on 
prototypes that have settled within consciousness over the course of evolution. Every 
word can trigger an association on the basis of which the imagination circles around 
an  identical  semantic  field  and  words  are  thereby  stamped  with  ―typicality‖  and 
distinguish themselves through characteristics. Hence, for systems-theory, language 
serves as a catalyst for consciousness to process certain thoughts or ideas according to 
the regularities which govern language-use. 
On the other hand, language can also captivate communication. As mentioned 
above, language can optimize communication by allowing it to draw on an extensive 
capacity for making distinctions. 
 
[Language]  has  the  peculiar  ability  to  practically  compel  a  distinction 
between utterance and information, for whenever one uses language, one can 
[…]  not  easily  deny  an  intent  to  communicate;  and  at  the  same  time, 
                                                           
20 ―Das Bewusstsein kann sich deshalb einer laufenden Kommunikation kaum entziehen. Es kann sie 
allenfalls beim Zuhören mit einigen Extravaganzen umspielen oder mit eigenen Beiträgen zu reizen 
versuchen‖(LUHMANN 1994: 48). 
21 ―Die wahrnehmbaren Sprachartefakte müssen nicht nur faszinieren, sie müssen auch auf eine noch 
kontrollierbare Weise Imagination anregen können‖ (LUHMANN 1994: 49). 11 
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whatever  one  has  spoken  about  can  become  the  topic  of  further 
communication‖ (LUHMANN 1994: 47).
22 
 
Luhmann‘s formulation of ―communicative intent‖ is problematic in that it recalls a 
model  of  speakers  that  is  informed  by  an  aesthetic  of  reception  and  based  on 
intersubjectivity. But the decisive aspect here is the notion that language can render 
communication more precise. Communicative intent need not be understood in terms 
of  intentionality,  but  rather  as  a  selective  event  that  fosters  the  communicative 
process. A linguistic expression is more complex and contains more information than, 
for example, a gesture. The function of language can be further concretized in terms of 
the metaphor of a magnet. Language can attract the attention of consciousness like a 
magnetic needle. This creates space for communication, which gains independence 
from consciousness at the other pole. The reverse of this is also the case: language can 
serve as a catalyst for communication in such a way as to grant consciousness more 
independence.  Whenever  language  attracts  the  attention  of  consciousness, 
communication can gain more freedom, that is, it gains a potential of possibilities to 
increase  or  reduce  its  own  possibilities.  Freedom  must  be  understood  here  in  the 
context  of  the  theory  of  observation:  freedom,  or  rather  independence,  makes  it 
possible for the psychic and social systems to carry on with their own selections in a 
more  ―undisturbed‖  manner.  Whenever  consciousness  is  captivated  by 
communication, communication can determine its possibilities in its own way. 
 
3.  Language as a Relationship between Medium and Form 
 
Although  systems  can  distance  themselves  and  achieve  momentary  independence 
from one another through language, social and psychic systems remain bound to one 
                                                           
22  ―Sie  [die  Sprache]  hat  dafür  die  Eigentümlichkeit,  eine  Unterscheidung  von  Mitteilung  und 
Information  praktisch  zu  erzwingen,  denn  wenn  man  Sprache  benutzt,  kann  man  [...]  eine 
kommunikative  Absicht  nicht  gut  leugnen;  und  zugleich  kann  es  Gegenstand  weiterer 
Kommunikationen werden, worüber man gesprochen hat‖ (LUHMANN 1994: 47). 12 
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another  in  a  relationship  of  dependence.  Language  controls  and  governs  this 
relationship  by  structurally  coupling  consciousness  and  communication  with  one 
another. How can language allow psychic and social systems to interpenetrate one 
another? Luhmann makes the following suggestion here: ―One can prepare the way 
for an answer to this question with the help of distinguishing between medium and 
form‖ (LUHMANN 1994: 53).
23 The definition of language as a medium constitutes 
the precondition for the structural coupling of language and consciousness. The 
relationship between medium and form subverts traditional philosophical distinctions 
of substance and accidence: ―The distinction [between medium and form] is meant to 
replace the distinction substance/accidence, or objects/properties‖ (LUHMANN 1994: 
53)
24. Luhmann presents a very open way of grasping what a  medium can be: 
―Medium in this sense is every loosely coupled relation of elements that is disposed to 
being  formed‖  (LUHMANN  1994:  53).
25  A medium  does  not  embody  a  material 
substance,  which  can  assume  different  forms,  rather  medium  describes  formed 
possibilities that make forms possible. To take a concrete example: air and light serve 
as media of perception. A medium is not to be conceived as an independent unity, but 
rather in relationship to form. Further, the relationship to form represents no closed or 
harmonic unity.
26 A medium must be grasped as a difference of the form: ―In addition 
to that, while being bound by form, the medium must be preserved as a medium even 
as it is ‗deformed‘ by the form‖ (LUHMANN 1994: 53).
27  
While a medium is a conglomeration of unformed and unordered elements, 
these elements can be identified. To that extent, every medium is simultaneously a 
                                                           
23 ―Eine Antwort auf diese Frage kann mit Hilfe der Unterscheidung von Medium und Form vorbereitet 
werden‖ (LUHMANN 1994: 53). 
24  ―Die  Unterscheidung  Medium/Form  dient  dazu,  die  Unterscheidung  Substanz/Akzidenz  oder 
Ding/Eigenschaft zu ersetzen‖ (LUHMANN 1994: 102). 
25 ―Medium in diesem Sinne ist jeder lose gekoppelte Zusammenhang von Elementen, der für Formung 
verfügbar ist‖ (LUHMANN 1994: 53). 
26 For more on the relation between medium and form, see GUMBRECHT (1996).  
27 ―Es muss außerdem in der Bindung durch Form als Medium erhalten bleiben, wenngleich es durch 
die Form gewissermaßen „deformiert― wird‖ (LUHMANN 1994: 53). 13 
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form. The medium can be formed through its ―graininess‖ (LUHMANN: 1994, 53)
28 
and ―viscosity‖ (LUHMANN 1994: 53)
29, in that it can combine  and relate the forms 
already inherent to itself anew. Traditionally, form is usually seen as an ordered 
relationship and a unity of elements. But the systems -theoretical concept of form is 
quite different from this. Form is always regarded here as a relat ionship with two 
sides: it is the unity of the difference between them. The one side of the form brings 
forth a temporary state of elements, which is created through a distinction. This 
actualization always remains linked to the side of the form that is no t marked. No 
matter what is distinguished and marked, that which is not distinguished and marked 
is preserved on the other side of the given distinction. That which is distinguished 
only obtains meaning in relation to the other potentiality not actualized.  
To what  extent  can one understand language as a medium in this way? 
Language is not a medium in terms of the ―physical quality of its signs nor in the 
conscious states of its speakers and listeners, readers and writers‖ (LUHMANN 1994: 
54).
30 As a medium, language is neither a conglomeration of signs or thoughts, which 
can be articulated as words and sentences, nor can it be understood as a signifying 
system. The medial aspects of language consist in the autopoiesis of communication, 
for  which  the  structura l  coupling  of  communication  and  consciousness  is  the 
preconditon.  
[Language]  has  its  basis  far  more  in  the  following:  that  the  numerous 
structurally determined systems of consciousness are operatively closed and 
thus operate with regard to one another only in accidental, occasional, and 
loosely coupled ways. The operatively necessary separation amidst possible 
congruence,  primarily  of  perceiving,  offers  the  possibility  for  constituting 
language as a medium and, in this medium, constituting self-generated forms, 
namely sentences. (LUHMANN 1994: 54)
31 
                                                           
28 ―Körnigkeit‖ (LUHMANN 1994: 53) 
29 ―Viskosität‖ (LUHMANN 1994: 53) 
30 ―physischen Eigenschaft ihrer Zeichen noch in den Bewusstseinszuständen der Hörer und Sprecher 
oder Leser und Schreiber‖ (LUHMANN 1994: 54). 
31 ―Sie (die Sprache) hat ihre Grundlage vielmehr darin, dass eine Vielzahl von strukturdeterminierten 
Bewusstseinssystemen  jeweils  operativ  geschlossen  und  daher  im  Verhältnis  zueinander  nur 
akzidentiell,  nur  okkasionell,  nur  lose  gekoppelt  operiert.  Die  operativ  notwendige  Trennung  bei 
möglicher Kongruenz, vor allem des Wahrnehmens, bietet die Möglichkeit, Sprache als Medium zu 14 
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In reading this passage one must grow accustomed to Luhmann‘s paradoxical style of 
argumentation.  The  initial  question  concerns  the  extent  to  which  language  makes 
structural  coupling  possible.  The  answer  that  Luhmann  provides  is  that  the 
interpenetration of communication and consciousness is made possible through the 
structural coupling of communication and consciousness. While this argument sounds 
tautological—something  is  the  case  because  it  is  the  case—it  is  nonetheless 
argumentatively  relevant  in  the  context  of  systems-theory.  Communication  and 
consciousness  presuppose  themselves,  even  though  they  cannot  presuppose 
themselves. To put it differently, the systems are what they are only because they are, 
in  the  sense  of  the  theory  of  observation,  different  from  that  which  they  do  not 
represent.  
The medial aspects of language rest on the loose coupling of the systems of 
consciousness  and  communication.  As  a  loosely  coupled  relation  of elements,  i.e. 
words, language can allow forms to be generated, that is, sentences to be formed. This 
does  not  only have a ―binding effect‖ (LUHMANN  1994: 55)
32 on the psychic and 
communicative systems. It also allows the two systems to constitute themselves vis-à-
vis one another. By means of providing for the structural coupling, language places 
the  two  systems  in  a  constitutive  relationship.  Language  contributes  to  the 
differentiation of the psychic and communicative systems by allowing boundaries to 
be established that are constituti ve of the systems: ―It is through language that the 
constitution of consciousness and the constitution of society are possible in the first 
place‖  (LUHMANN  1994:  47).
33  It is not that language marks a boundary between 
language and non-language, ―but rather a multitude of systemic boundaries according 
                                                                                                                                                                      
konstituieren  und  in  diesem  Medium  dann  selbstgenerierte  Formen,  nämlich  Sätze  zu  bilden‖ 
(LUHMANN 1994: 54). 
32 ―Bindungseffekt‖ (LUHMANN 1994: 55) 
33  ―Über  Sprache  wird  Bewusstseinsbildung  und  Gesellschaftsbildung  überhaupt  erst  möglich‖ 
(LUHMANN 1994: 47). 15 
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to  whatever  works  for  communication  or  consciousness  respectively‖  (LUHMANN 
1994: 51)
34 
For example, two taxis colliding into each other on the street can irritate a 
perceiving psychic system. The psychic system  carries out a selective perception: it 
sees the accident. When, later, the psychic system tells another psychic system about 
the accident, the one gives the other selective information: ―Two taxis collided into 
each other on the street.‖ The other psychic system is irritated by the information 
uttered.  It  makes  a  claim  on  his  consciousness.  ―Ideally,‖  this  consciousness 
understands that two taxis have collided. Only at this moment does communication 
take  place  upon  the  participation  of  consciousness  in  the  medium  of  language. 
Language takes part in both systems and has served as a catalyst to each, without 
changing anything with regard to the difference between the two systems.  
As  a  medium,  language  embodies  a  ―non-system‖  that  generates  systemic 
constructions. To what extent can one describe its reality in such terms? The reality of 
language no longer rests on a model of substance that inquires into the ―essence,‖ the 
―what‖ of the phenomenon. Systems-theory prohibits such an approach to questions 
about substance. Furthermore, language does not consist of a conglomeration of signs: 
―Nor do we follow the semiotic theory of language. Language is not a system of signs 
for non-linguistic relations of things‖ (LUHMANN 1994: 51).
35 With that, Luhmann 
criticizes the  conception of linguistics in that he does not allow for words and 
sentences to be understood in terms of their use as signs that are constitutive of 
linguistic communication. Words and sentences can indeed function as signs, but they 
are not the material  of linguistic communication. The reality of language rather 
consists in its use: ―It is completely sufficient to state that language exists concretely 
in  its  use  as  language  and  by  extension  in  its  being  observed  as  language  by  an 
                                                           
34 ―sondern eine Vielheit von Systemgrenzen je nachdem, was kommunikativ und bewusstseinsmäßig 
gelingt‖ (LUHMANN 1994: 51). 
35 ―Ebenso wenig folgen wir der semiotischen Sprachtheorie. Sprache ist kein System von Zeichen für 
aussersprachliche Sachverhalte‖ (LUHMANN 1994: 51). 16 
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observer‖  (LUHMANN  1994:  52).
36  Its reality thus consists in its being able to be 
observed and not in its function to represent something that is independent thereof. It 
is the capacity of language to distinguish which observation describes its reality and in 
this  way  it  defers to  consciousness. It is indeed possible that language irritates 
consciousness by making conspicuous claims on it, but language does not possess any 
conscious-like qualities. Systems-theory‘s separation of consciousness and language 
renders  numerous  other  theories,  which  deal  with  the  connections  between  the 
constitution  of  the  subject,  cognition,  language  and  understanding,  vulnerable  to 
criticism.
37 
 
4.  Problems  and  open  questions  about  Luhmann’s 
conception of language 
 
Further reflection on Luhmann‘s separation of language and consciousness reveals 
problems  with  his  argument:  he describes  perception as  a function of the psychic 
system. By means of perception, consciousness can perceive things in its environment, 
whereby  these  appear  to  consciousness  as  immediately  given.  In  fact,  however, 
consciousness relies on the brain‘s own complexity, which construes an image of the 
external world for consciousness in its own way: ―The brain represses, if you will, its 
own work in order to make the world appear as a world‖ (LUHMANN 2000: 6).
38 
Perception is a procedure by which consciousness demarcates forms in respective 
media  with  the  help  of  the  brain‘s  performance.  For  example,  consciousness  can 
translate the perceived taxi, referred to above, into the medium of language, whereby 
perception, as a function of consciousness, and language remain separate unities. How 
                                                           
36 ―Es genügt vollauf, zu sagen, dass die Sprache in ihrer Benutzung als Sprache und sodann in ihrer 
Beobachtung von Sprache durch einen Beobachter konkret existiert‖ (LUHMANN 1994: 52). 
37This would apply to psychoanalytic theories for example, such as Lacan‘s, which are based on the 
linguistic characteristics of consciousness. 
38 ―Das Gehirn unterdrückt, wenn man so sagen darf, seine Eigenleistung, um Welt als Welt erscheinen 
zu lassen‖ (LUHMANN 1997: 15). 17 
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then does Luhmann, after having expounded on the matter in this way, arrive at the 
following assumption: ―The extent to which perception is prestructured by language is 
equally  well  known‖  (LUHMANN  2000:  6).
39  How can he logically justify this 
statement, after having advanced the claim that language can only be coupled to 
consciousness, and by extension, to perception? If perception is linguistically pre -
structured, is he not thereby suggesting that consciousness is language -like, or has a 
linguistic character? But this model Luhmann criticizes by defining language as a 
function of communication. If language can structure perception, then he is situating 
language within the cognitive apparatus of the human being. The word ―structured‖ 
creates the impression that language cannot only connect to consciousness, but rather 
that language  itself is a disposition of consciousness. Even if one reads ―structures‖ in 
terms of structural coupling, ambiguities remain.  
Structural coupling, according to Luhmann, describes a procedure in which 
systems  can  connect  to  non-systems  and  the  environments  of  systems  through  a 
medium. If language and consciousness are respective environments of each other, to 
what extent can one environment structure the other? Language can indeed irritate 
consciousness, but it cannot change anything about the latter‘s structure. Is the claim 
about perception‘s being structured by language one of the paradoxes Luhmann builds 
into his argumentative procedure or is there a lack of precision in the separation of 
language and consciousness? At this point of Luhman‘s argumentation, a more precise 
explanation as to how to conceive of the relationship between pre-structuration and 
structuration  is  lacking.  In  my  view,  the  lack  of  clarity  here  points  to  a  more 
fundamental problem of systems-theory: this is the rigid separation of language and 
consciousness itself. If one follows Luhmann‘s argument about the difference between 
language and consciousness, language can in no way emerge within consciousness.  
Luhmann does not undertake any attempt to examine the cognitive conditions 
through  which  language  may  originate:  ―We  presuppose  language  as  given‖ 
                                                           
39 ―Ebenso ist bekannt, wie stark Wahrnehmung durch Sprache vorstrukturiert wird‖ (LUHMANN 1997: 
15). 18 
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(LUHMANN 2000: 16).
40 To this point, he adds a footnote: ―We are not investigating, 
in Kantian fashion, the conditions of possibility for language, nor are we conducting a 
Darwinian inquiry into the evolution of language‖ (LUHMANN 2000: 323).
41 In his 
writings,  Luhmann  works  p urposefully  on  perception,  consciousness  and 
communication, with an emphasis on reconstructing the relation between the subject 
and society.  
Yet, because language is subject to cognitive evolution, an account of which is 
crucial to understanding the phenomenon of language, the omission of questions as to 
the  conditions  of  language‘s  origination  remains  problematic. In his  discussion of 
language, Luhmann only refers to the question of social evolution. But an analysis of 
language cannot do without an explanation of its cognitive evolution. It is not a matter 
of returning to questions that are caught up in the philosophy of the subject, but rather 
the  need  to  connect  an  analysis  of  language  to  cognitive  processes.  What 
disadvantages would systems-theory incur by treating language in conjunction with 
cognitive  evolution?  Luhmann  primarily  focuses  on  the  phenomenon  of  social 
evolution with regard to language, whereby his view of society‘s development departs 
significantly  from  traditional  models  of  evolution.  In  systems-theory,  evolution  is 
understood to presuppose itself in that the development of autopoietic systems rests on 
their self-selective decoupling from their environments. With that, Luhmann distances 
himself  from  mutation  as  a  basic  principle  of  evolutionary  theory.  The  basis  for 
evolution no longer consists in unexpected events, since only contingent events occur 
within the environment of a system. In systems-theory, evolution depends on whether 
a system allows itself to be irritated by an event to such an extent that the system is 
structurally transformed.  
 
The theory of evolution deploys a specific distinction, namely, the distinction 
between variety, selection, and restabilization. This line of questioning does 
                                                           
40 ―Das Entstandensein von Sprache setzen wir voraus‖ (LUHMANN 1997: 31). 
41 ―Wir fragen also nicht im Stile Kants nach den Bedingungen ihrer Möglichkeit; und auch nicht im 
Stile Darwins nach ihrer Evolution‖ (LUHMANN 1997: 31). 19 
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not focus on a process, nor does it attempt to explain in a historical or causal 
manner why things happen the way they do (LUHMANN 2000: 211).
42 
 
Evolution  is  an  event  in  which  autopoietic  systems  perceive  events  in  their 
environments  that  appear  arbitrary  and  new.  Luhmann  describes  this  moment  as 
variation.  Variations  can  serve  as  catalysts  for  the  system  to  transform  itself 
structurally  or  rather  to  make  so-called  selections,  which  prove  or  do  not  prove 
capable of stabilizing themselves. Evolution does not thereby describe a development 
that  is  teleologically  driven.  On  the  contrary,  it  proceeds  erratically.  Why  does 
systems-theory not attempt to address the phenomenon of the cognitive development 
of language according to its own concept of evolution? Instead, language is treated 
only  as  an  epiphenomenon  of  the  evolution  of  society,  without  addressing  its 
evolution in the context of its cognitive capacities and the question of consciousness. 
The role of language in society and its social evolution is only important to Luhmann 
with regard to the development of the media technologies of modern society. Written 
language presents an increase in the complexity of language, because it is supported 
by  optic  and  acoustic  perception,  which  can  lead  to  a  further  differentiation  of 
communication.  Written  language  can  also  facilitate  writing  and  reading  which 
likewise optimize the possibilities of communication. Written language also increases 
the possibilities of linguistic communication by making communication possible in 
the absence of communicative partners. In printed language, above all, in the form of 
books,  the possibilities of communication are significantly improved. Through the 
societal development of print media, communication gains more freedom from spatial, 
temporal and also social conditions.  
But to what extent does language, in addition to its role in the evolutionary 
processes of society, participate in the evolution of consciousness and the cognitive 
                                                           
42 ―Die Evolutionstheorie benutzt eine spezifische Art von Unterscheidung, nämlich die Unterscheidung 
von  Variation,  Selektion  und  Restabilisierung.  Die  Fragestellung  zielt  nicht  auf  einen  Prozess,  sie 
versucht erst recht nicht, geschichtlich oder gar kausal zu erklären, weshalb es so gekommen ist, wie es 
gekommen ist‖ (LUHMANN 1997: 345). 
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system? How, from a systems-theoretical view, does language emerge? Again, the 
point  here  is  not  to  reintroduce  a  line  of  questioning  from  the  philosophy  of  the 
subject,  but  rather  to  develop  a  stronger  account  of  the  cognitive  dimensions  of 
language. In systems-theory, language has the character of a technical invention. What 
disadvantages would systems-theory incur by situating language and the conditions of 
its origination more within the realm of cognition? By reformulating the question of 
language in terms of communication, Luhmann creates a restricted view of language. 
The danger here is that he overemphasizes the category of the social in analogy to the 
tradition  that  placed  consciousness  at  the  center  of  social  life.  The  concept  of 
communication  in  systems-theory  threatens  to  work  against  its  own  polycentric 
demand by allowing communication to take the place of the center. There is a self-
observation missing here, in lieu of which the theory‘s tendency to overdetermining 
the category of the social is accentuated. 
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